**COURSE CONTENT**

Companies (managers, individuals) often make decisions that affect the well-being of others. In turn, our payoff (compensation, well-being) is often affected by the choices made by others. In simpler terms, people often operate in situations of strategic interaction. Game Theory is the discipline that studies strategic interaction. The theory has two inter-related goals:
1. To advise parties involved in situations of strategic interaction on the best course of action.
2. To predict the outcome of strategic interaction.

This course is an introduction to Game Theory. Our goal is to learn the basic conceptual tools from Game Theory and identify some real-life business situations where these tools can be useful to a manager. The games presented and solved in class go to the essence (often in the simplest framework possible) of particular aspects of strategic interaction that arise in real-life situations. To understand the similarities between these simple games and the many situations that arise both in business and in our daily economic lives, the course provides applications of the theory to business and economics.

**COURSE STRUCTURE**

Classes will combine theory and applications. We will present the concepts required to analyze different forms of strategic interaction. For instance: What do you know when you have to make a decision? Do you observe the choices of your opponents? Do you interact with them repeatedly? Different answers to these questions call for different frames of analysis. We will then apply the theory to business and economic situations. For example, we will study price and quantity competition, endogenous barriers, formation and stability of cartels, and auctions.

**READINGS**

Readings are available online, linked from the Canvas course website. These range from news articles to chapters of books. Readings are optional.

The course has an optional recommended textbook:
Also recommended for lighter reading on business and games are:


**PROBLEMS AND ASSIGNMENTS**

**Optional problems:** There is a collection of optional problems on Canvas. The problems follow the progression of the material covered in class. Problems are solved by the TA during the Friday review sessions. Solutions will be posted on Canvas.

**Assignments:** There are three graded assignments. Students are encouraged to work in groups for the assignments, but the answers must be turned in *individually*. Assignments are due at the beginning of the class indicated in the course outline. They will be handed out one week before the due date.

**Grading Policy and Class Participation**

Grades in the course will be based on the three assignments, a final exam, and class participation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final Exam</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assignments</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class Participation</td>
<td>20%</td>
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Each student’s participation will be evaluated with respect to the contribution that the student makes towards the entire class’ learning experience. The quality of contribution matters more than the frequency of speech.
## Course Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Readings</th>
<th>Assignment Due Date</th>
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</table>
| Class 1| Course Introduction  
What is a Game?                                                   | Chapter 1                                     |                     |
| Class 2| Simultaneous Games I  
How Far Can We Go with Rationality?                                | Chapter 4 (pp. 84-85, 90-98)                  | R1                  |
| Class 3| Simultaneous Games II  
Nash Equilibrium, Being Unpredictable                                  | Chapter 4 (pp. 86-90, 98-113), Chapter 7     | R2                  |
| Class 4| Strategic Competition I  
Prisoners’ Dilemma                                                   | Chapter 5 (pp. 124-131)                       | R3, R4              |
| Class 5| Strategic Competition II  
Avoiding Prisoners’ Dilemma                                          |                                               | Assignment 1        |
| Class 6| Sequential Games I  
Looking Forward, Reasoning Back                                        | Chapter 3, Chapter 10                         |                     |
| Class 7| Sequential Games II  
Endogenous Barriers to Entry                                         | Chapter 10                                    | R6, R7              |
| Class 8| Sequential Games III  
Bargaining, Dynamic Pricing                                              | Chapter 17                                    |                     |
| Class 9| Repeated Games  
Stability of Cartels                                                      | Chapter 11 (pp. 345-356)                     | R8, R9              |
| Class 10| Auctions I  
Private Values                                                       | Chapter 16                                    | Assignment 2        |
| Class 11| Auctions II  
Common Values, Wars of Attrition                                      | Chapter 16                                   | R10, R11, R12       |
| Class 12| Review                                                               |                                               |                     |